Abstract. Key escrow is an inherent property in the current proposed Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) systems. However the key escrow is not always a good property for all applications. In this paper, we present a scheme which removes the key escrow from the IBE system proposed by Bonch and Franklin, while at the same time maintaining some important properties of the IBE. We also present some cryptosystems based on our variant including a signature scheme and an authenticated key agreement. We finally show how to integrate our scheme into a hierarchial identity based public key encryption system and a key-insulated system.
Introduction
Since the landmark paper "New directions in cryptography" [9] was published in 1976, public key systems have been playing a fundamental role in the modern information security society. To address the security threat of the "man-in-themiddle" attack, complicated public key certification systems have been developed for years. But the widespread deployment of public key systems depends heavily on the certification distribution systems which suffer from a scalability problem.
In an attempt to simplify the public key directory management in a Public Key Center (PKC), in 1984 Shamir [17] first formulated the concept of IdentityBased Cryptography (IBC) in which a public key is the identity (an arbitrary string) of an entity. Shamir presented an identity-based signature scheme in [17] and more signature schemes were proposed later. However constructing a practical Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) scheme has been an open problem for about twenty years. Recently Boneh and Franklin [3] and Cocks [6] presented two different systems separately. Boneh-Franklin's scheme has drawn much attention because of its provable security and efficiency in practice. Our work is based on this scheme.
In an IBE system there are four algorithms: (1) Setup generates the global system parameters and a master-key, (2) Extract uses the master-key to generate the private key corresponding to an arbitrary public key string ID ∈ {0, 1}
Because an entity's identity (ID) is used as the public key directly, some interesting usages of an IBE can be naturally introduced. For example an ID can include the public key expiry time, or differentiate the entity's credentials. On the other hand a special property is inherent in the proposed IBE scheme. In Shamir's scheme, the PKC uses the Extract algorithm to generate a private key corresponding to the public ID. Hence the PKC knows all the entities' private keys. This property is called "key escrow ". Because the proposed scheme [3] and [6] follow Shamir's scheme to setup systems, they also inherit the key escrow function. However the key escrow function is not necessary for all types of applications and a cryptosystem with a key escrow property has some serious disadvantages. For example once the master-key is exposed, all the entities' private keys are leaked in principle and all the prior communication information is under threat of exposure. Some mechanisms can be used to increase the security of the master-key, for example the threshold cryptography [12] [7] . Gentry and Silverberg presented a method in a hierarchical ID-based scheme [13] to restrict the key escrow function in small areas. But the existence of a master-key is still a threat to an entity's privacy. In [1] Al-Riyami and Paterson introduced the concept of "Certificateless Public Key Cryptography" (CL-PKC) and presented a scheme which removes the key escrow property successfully. In this paper, we introduce the "nickname" concept and present another variant of BonehFranklin's IBE system without the key escrow function. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the original Boneh-Franklin's IBE scheme which is the basis of our variant, and we also briefly introduce the bilinear map which is the basic mathematical tool used in the scheme. In the next section, we present our scheme to show how to remove the key escrow function. A security analysis of our variant is presented in Section 4. Section 5 and 6 is a signature scheme and an authenticated key agreement based on our variant separately. We show how to integrate our scheme into a hierarchial identity-based public key encryption system in Section 7. And then we show an application of the new property of master-key forward secrecy in a key-insulated system. Finally we make a comparison with the CL-PKC scheme.
Non-degenerate: For a given point
There is an efficient algorithm to computeê(P, Q) for any P, Q ∈ G 1 .
The modified Weil and Tate pairings [18] on elliptic curves can be used to build such bilinear maps. The security of Boneh-Franklin's scheme is based on an assumption of the hardness of the "Bilinear Diffie-Hellman" (BDH) problem. 
For any randomized polynomial time (in
Boneh-Franklin's IBE scheme also follows the four steps proposed by Shamir. Here is the description of the scheme in detail. Setup: Given a security parameter k, the parameter generator follows the steps.
1. Generate two cyclic groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order q and a bilinear pairing mapê :
Pick a random generator P ∈ G 1 . 2. Pick a random integer s ∈ Z * q and compute P pub = sP . 3. Pick four cryptographic hash functions
n . The system parameters are params = q, G 1 , G 2 ,ê, n, P, P pub , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 . s is the master-key of the system. Extract: Given a string ID ∈ {0, 1} * , the params and the master-key, the algorithm computes Q ID = H 1 (ID) ∈ G 3. If U = r P , reject the ciphertext, else return m as the plaintext.
The consistency of the scheme follows from the bilinearity ofê. Boneh and Franklin proved that the scheme is semantically secure against the adaptive chosen ciphtertext attack (IND-CCA2) [2] [3] in the random oracle model [5] .
3 Our Variant of Boneh-Franklin's IBE system Based on Boneh-Franklin's scheme, we introduce another public and private key pair N ID , t into the scheme to remove the key escrow function. The private key t, a random integer in Z * q , is only owned by the entity with an identity ID (we use entity ID to refer to the entity with the identity ID in the remaining part of the paper). In our scheme the encryption and decryption operations not only depend on the public key ID (in fact Q ID ) and the private key d ID , but also on the second public key N ID and the corresponding private key t. We name the public keys ID, N ID as ID, N ickname and the private keys d ID , t as P rKeyL, P rKeyR . Because only entity ID knows P rKeyR, we can prove that the key escrow function in the PKC is removed. The effect of introducing N ID , t is discussed after the description of the scheme's details. We can find that to publish a nickname is not a serious new burden for a PKC. For simplicity we name our system as V-IBE and Boneh-Franklin's scheme as B-IBE in the following sections.
Our scheme is specified by five algorithms: Setup, Extract, Publish, Encrypt and Decrypt. Setup: As the one in Boneh-Franklin's scheme. Extract: Identical to Extract in Boneh-Franklin's scheme. Publish: Given the system parameters params, an entity selects a random t ∈ Z * q and computes N ID = N 1 , N 2 = tP, tP pub . The entity can ask the PKC to publish this extra parameter N ID or publishes it by itself or via any directory service as its nickname. Note that this publishing operation has no security requirement. Instead, we can construct another Publish operation. Encrypt: Given a plaintext m ∈ M, the identity ID, the public parameters params and the nickname N ID = N 1 , N 2 corresponding to ID, the following steps are performed. The consistency of the scheme can be verified by
Hence σ in decryption equals σ in encryption. Thus, applying decryption on a ciphertext recovers the original message m. Based on the BDH and another assumption stated in the next section, we can prove that the variant is secure against the adaptive chosen ciphtertext attack (IND-CCA2) in the random oracle model. Moreover this scheme achieves some special properties that make it different from the normal public key systems and the existing identity-based encryption schemes. This claim follows from Theorem 2 in the following section. Because of this property, some special usages of the original IBE are still applicable in our scheme, e.g., an entity's ID appending with an expiry time or credentials. An application example in Section 8 demonstrates this point. 
The V-IBE's Security
Before defining the security of the scheme, we describe two primitives of the variant.
Firstly we prove that based on the BDH assumption, it is hard for the PKC to compute g in decryption, even though it knows the master key s. To construct g , the PKC needs to use the available information (s, 
Secondly we show that if an adversary without the master key wants to compute g =ê(rP, Q ID ) (s+t) in decryption, it needs to solve some hard problem. Without the check step, the scheme is obviously insecure. An adversary can randomly select j ∈ Z * q and sets N 1 = tP = −P pub + jP (i.e., s + t = j mod q), so as to compute g =ê(U, Q ID ) j . But by applying the check step, the adversary needs to find N 2 = tsP = (j−s)sP to pass the check. If the adversary successfully finds N 2 , then it is able to compute s 2 P = N 2 − jsP . Given G 1 , q, P, sP to compute s 2 P is a squaring-DH problem in group G 1 , which is as hard as a normal DH problem because the order of G 1 is known [16] . If an adversary A knows t and can compute g , we can slightly modify A to solve the BDH problem. Given a BDH problem P, sP, aP, rP where s, a, r
The output is just the solution to the BDH problem. Note that a legitimate party has both t and saP to compute R. If A does not know t and j = s + t mod q, it seems hard to find such N 1 and N 2 satisfying the check requirement and at the same time making the computation of g easy. Based on this evaluation, we propose an assumption. Now by defining two types of adversary, which correspond to an adversary with and without the master-key respectively, we state the security analysis in two theorems. Definition: Type-I Attack An adversary with the master-key launches a Type-I attack by taking one or more of the following actions interacting with a challenger following from the IND-CCA2 security notion. If the adversary with the master-key also changes the nickname N ch of the entity ID ch on which it wants to be challenged, it knows both d ch and t ch . Hence the scheme cannot protect the information encrypted under ID ch and the changed nickname. In traditional public key cryptosystems this attack is not prevented either. This is the reason for the rules 4 in the challenge phase. In the IND-CCA2 model, an adversary can continue to ask queries after the challenge phase. The advantage of an adversary is defined as the amount by which the probability of guessing the correct b exceeds n for some integer n > 0. 
The message space is
M = {0, 1} n . The ciphertext space is C = G * 1 × {0, 1} n . The public params is q, G 1 , G 2 ,ê,
Choose a random r ∈ Z *
q and compute C = rP, m ⊕ H 2 (g r ) , where g = e(P pub + N 1 , Q ID ).
decrypt: Given a ciphertext C = U, V , the public params and the private key d ID , follow the steps: 
Definition 3 BasicP ub BasicP ub is similar to BasicP ub except that s is publicly available, so is d ID , but t is kept secret. Hence the public params is
The remaining problem is to calculate the probability that B does not abort during simulation. The algorithm B could abort when one of the following events happens: (1) Event 1, denoted as H 1 : A queries P rKeyR for ID I at some point; (2) Event 2, denoted as H 2 : A did not choose ID I as ID ch ; or (3) Event 3, denoted as H 3 : A relayed a decryption query on C ch = U , V , W to C in phase 2.
Because of the way that B forwards ciphertexts, the last event implies that A didn't choose ID I . We also notice that the Event ¬H 2 implies that the event ¬H 1 . Hence we have
So, the lemma follows. Proof. The proof can easily follow from Theorem 4.5 in [3] . We can regard t and N 1 = tP in BasicP ub hy of V-IBE as s and P pub = sP in the BasicP ub hy of B-IBE in [3] respectively. s, P pub and d ID in BasicP ub hy are fixed value which will not affect the scheme's security. Proof. The proof is similar to Lemma 4.3 in [3] . Algorithm B is given as input the BDH parameters q, G 1 , G 2 ,ê produced by G and a random instance P, aP, bP, cP where a, b, c are random in Z * q and P is random in G * 1 . Let  D =ê(P, P ) abc ∈ G 2 be the solution to this BDH problem. Algorithm B finds D by interacting with A as follows:
Lemma 4 Suppose that H 2 is a random oracle. Suppose there exists a Type-I IND-CPA adversary
Algorithm B simulate algorithm keygen of BasicP ub to create the public params K pub = q, G 1 , G 2 ,ê, n, s, P, P pub , Q ID , d ID , N ID , H Challenge: Algorithm A outputs two messages m 0 , m 1 on which it wants to be challenged. B choose a random string R ∈ {0, 1} n and defines C ch = U , V = cP, R . B gives C ch as the challenge to A . Observe that the decryption of C ch is
Guess: Algorithm A outputs its guess c ∈ {0, 1}. Assume that A has queried q 2 distinct value on H 2 , following from the above two claims, we have that B produces the correct answer with probability at least 2n(k)/q 2 .
Proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. This theorem directly follows from the following Lemma 5, Lemma 6 and Lemma 7. The basic strategy follows from the method in [11] which implies that the scheme has the plaintext-awareness property. Note that in the random oracle model, a plaintext-aware system is IND-CCA2 secure [2] . 
n . To recover the correct plaintext m corresponding to C, A needs to compute V ⊕H 2 (R). B randomly chooses i from {1, . . . , q 2 } and returns H 2,i . Assume A wins the game with non-negligible probability n(k). Let H denote the event that H 2 (R) was queried. Because H 2 is a random oracle, if A does not query H 2 (R), it can only guess the correct H 2 (R) with negligible probability (k) by some means. Hence The following is a two-party key agreement protocol which extends Smart's protocol [19] . Although A and B can use H(K xyP ) as the shared key, where H is a proper hash function to achieve forward security, Shim's protocol and its descendant [8] are vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attack launched by the PKC. The new variant still suffers from such attack if the PKC replaces the nicknames in the two messages with its own selections. However we can use the same method mentioned in Section 3 to thwart such attacks.
Hierarchical PKE
In [13] Gentry and Silverberg introduced a totally collusion-resistant hierarchical ID-based infrastructure for encryption and signature. We integrate our scheme into this hierarchical system to eliminate all kinds of key escrow to any ancestor of an entity. In the system, every entity is located in one level of a hierarchical system. Except the root entity, every entity is identified by an ID-tuple which identifies every ancestor along the path to the root. The major steps of our scheme are identical to the ones in [13] . Root Setup: Given a security parameter k, the parameter generator follows the steps.
1. Generate two cyclic groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order q and a bilinear pairing mapê : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 . Pick a random generator P 0 ∈ G 1 . 2. Pick a random integer s 0 ∈ Z * q and compute Q 0 = s 0 P 0 . 3. Pick two cryptographic hash functions H 1 : {0, 1} * → G
